Single Mothers Working at Night: Standard Work, Child Care Subsidies, and Implications for Welfare Reform * Using a data set from the post welfare reform environment (the 1999 National Survey of America's Families), this paper investigates the impact of child care subsidies on the standard work (i.e., work performed during the traditional work hours of 8 a.m. and 6 p.m. through Monday and Friday) decision of single mothers and tests whether this impact differs between welfare recipients and nonrecipients. The econometric strategy accounts for sample selection into the labor force and the potential endogeneity of child care subsidy receipt and welfare participation. Results suggest that child care subsidies are associated with a 6 percentage point increase in the probability of single mothers working at standard jobs. When the impact of subsidies is allowed to differ between welfare recipients and non-recipients, results indicate that welfare recipients are 14 percentage points more likely to work at standard jobs than others when they are offered a child care subsidy. Among non-recipients, child care subsidies increase standard work probability by only 1 percentage point. These results underscore the importance of child care subsidies helping low-income parents, especially welfare recipients, find jobs with conventional or standard schedules and lend support to the current practice of states' giving priority to welfare recipients for child care subsidies. Results are found to be robust to numerous specification checks.
With the passage of welfare reform in 1996, child care assistance has become a significant tool for helping welfare recipients move into the workforce and for helping other low-income families stay off welfare.
1 According to the General Accounting
Office, a vast majority of states make welfare recipients and families making the transition from welfare to work eligible for child care assistance or give them higher priority than other low-income families when resources are insufficient to cover all who apply (GAO 2003) . Almost seven years after the welfare reform bill, Congress now debates legislation to reauthorize welfare reform, and child care funding remains a key issue. However, very little is known about whether child care subsidies have in fact played a role in increasing employment among welfare recipients, or in general, low income population in the post-welfare reform period (Blank 2002) . Even less is known about the effect of these subsidies on standard-nonstandard employment decisions of these individuals. This paper is an attempt to fill this gap.
Since the passage of welfare reform, the employment rate of single mothers has risen dramatically (Jones-DeWeer et al. 2003) . However, leaving welfare does not necessarily mean gaining adequate work and increasing economic self-sufficiency. For example, only eight percent of welfare leavers have been able to sustain employment over a period of four years (Martinson 2000) . Over three quarters (78%) of employed low income single mothers are concentrated in typically low-wage and low benefit occupations. (Jones-DeWeer et al. 2003) . These occupations typically demand a greater 1 The welfare reform legislation combined the previously existing four child care funding programs into the Child Care Development Fund (CCDF) and increased federal funding for child care substantially. It also gave states greater flexibility in setting up and administering their programs. In fiscal year 1999, states spent all of their CCDF allocation of around $5 billion and spent directly on child care or transferred another $4 billion from the TANF funds. See Blau (2003) for a summary of the system of child care assistance under welfare reform.
number of hours outside the standard weekday times of 8 a.m. to 6 p.m. 2 About one quarter of all welfare leavers worked night shifts or had irregular schedules on a regular basis in 1999 (Loprest 2002) . Despite gains in employment, about 52 percent of those who left welfare in 1999 had incomes below the poverty level (Nightingale 2002) . In sum, welfare reform may have been successful so far in helping welfare participants secure entry-level jobs; however, there is a great deal of concern over the possibility that many former welfare recipients who have gone to work are having difficulty finding stable employment and working at jobs with low wages and few benefits. This paper examines the capability of child care subsidies to help mothers find jobs with conventional or standard schedules, the kind of jobs that usually pay higher wages, provide better benefits, and lead to long-term economic well-being of parents.
A binary model of standard-nonstandard employment is estimated jointly with the binary models of subsidy receipt and labor force participation to control for endogeneity and selectivity, using full information maximum likelihood (FIML) . In order to test for a differential effect of subsidy receipt on standard work across welfare recipients and nonrecipients, the system of equations is re-estimated with the addition of an interaction of a welfare and subsidy indicator into the standard work model, controlling for the endogeneity of welfare receipt. Investigation of whether the effect of child care subsidies differs between welfare recipients and nonrecipients is particularly important because many states indicate that they give priority to families leaving welfare (Schumacher and Greenberg 1999) . 3 The analysis uses data from the 1999 National Survey of America's Families (NSAF), conducted by the Urban Institute. The NSAF provides the only available national household data from the post-welfare reform period with information on child care subsidies.
The rest of the paper is organized in the following way. Section II reviews the previous literature. Section III describes the theoretical model and discusses the econometric approach. Section IV introduces the data. Section V presents the results and section VI concludes the paper.
II. Previous Literature
Although this is the first paper to examine the impact of child care subsidies on standard work decision, it is not the first to consider the relationship between child care subsidies and employment of mothers. However, the vast majority of the literature on the impact of child care subsidies on employment focuses on the pre-welfare reform period.
Due to the fact that the welfare reform changed the system dramatically, results from the pre-welfare reform period may be less relevant to the impact of current subsidies (Blau and Tekin 2003) .
One body of evidence on the association between child care subsidies and employment comes from several demonstration projects designed to help economically disadvantaged families. These programs include child care subsidies along with other benefits and services. Most of these projects were conducted as randomized experiments prior to the 1996 welfare reform legislation and they typically find that employment increased as a result of the treatment. However, the child care subsidy is only one of a large number of services and benefits provided to the treatment group, therefore, it is not possible to isolate the actual subsidy impact from the overall program impact.
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The largest source of evidence on the effect of child care subsidies on employment comes from the studies on the impact of the price of child care. These studies typically use the variation in child care costs across individuals and the geographic variation in the cost of child care. 5 They studies implicitly rely on the strong assumption that there are no costs to taking up a subsidy either in the form of time costs required to deal with the bureaucratic system or the stigma of participating a meanstested program. If this assumption is not true however, then the price effect would not be a reliable estimate for the subsidy effect and the decision to take up a subsidy must be treated as an endogenous decision (Blau 2003) .
Research on the impact of actual subsidies has been limited, primarily due to lack of data. Berger and Black (1992) and Gelbach (2002) examine the effect of child care
subsidies by comparing the employment patterns of two groups of mothers who are separated from each other using a natural experiment. Both of these studies find positive impacts of child care subsidies on maternal employment. Meyers, Heintze, and Wolf (2002) use data from a sample of low income single mothers (current and recent welfare recipients in California between 1992 and 1995) to estimate the probability of their receiving child care subsidies and the effect of this probability on labor market activity.
The authors find that the probability of subsidy receipt is associated with an increase in the probability of employment. Blau and Tekin (2003) analyze the determinants of 4 Several examples of these demonstration projects are New Hope (Bos et al. 1999) , the Teenage Parent Demonstration (Kisker et al. 1998) , New Chance (Quint, Bos, and Polit 1997) , GAIN in California (Riccio et al. 1994) , the Minnesota Family Investment Program (Miller et al. 1997) , and the Florida Family Transition Program (Bloom et al. 1999) . 5 See Anderson and Levine (2000) for a summary of these studies.
receipt of child care subsidy and the effect of subsidy receipt on employment, unemployment, school attendance and welfare participation, using data from the NSAF.
The authors control for the endogeneity of child care subsidy receipt using instrumental variables. They find positive effects of child care subsidy receipt on employment.
The information on the link between the standard/nonstandard work and child care decisions of mothers is very limited and mostly descriptive in nature. Authors typically consider the impact of standard or nonstandard work on several outcomes such as modes of child care and the decision to use a child care subsidy (Burstein et al. 2001; Georges et al. 2001; Presser 1986; Presser 1988; Brayfield 1995; Casper and O'Connell 1998; Chaplin et al. 1999; Kimmel and Powell 2001; Kimmel and Powell 2002 ). An important difference between this paper and previous research in this area is that the focus here is on the standard/nonstandard work decision while previous studies concentrated on the effect of standard or nonstandard work on some other outcome measure. With the exception of the two studies by Kimmel and Powell, none of them addressed the endogeneity of standard/nonstandard work status. Kimmel and Powell (2001) examine the impact of standard work on the child care choices of single mothers and find that work patterns play an important role in mothers' decisions regarding the mode of child care.
III. Theoretical Model and Econometric Framework
The behavioral model developed in this section serves as a guide for the econometric model used for estimating the impact of child care subsidies on standard employment. Suppose that a single mother allocates her time between leisure and work.
She either works during standard hours or nonstandard hours but not both. If she does not work, she provides child care during her leisure hours. During her work hours, she can use market care or receive free care from a relative. The relative allocates her time between child care and leisure with employment ruled out for simplicity. Although the choice of paid versus unpaid care or the employment decision of the relative are not part of the empirical model, they are included in the theory in order to account for the use of unpaid child care (Blau and Tekin 2003) . The mother can receive a child care subsidy if she is eligible for one. In addition to satisfying the income condition, she must either be employed or in a work-related activity to be eligible for a subsidy as required by the law.
Furthermore, child care subsidies are conditioned on the use of market care. To the extent that such arrangements lack flexible hours, they might not be attractive to mothers working nonstandard hours. This would in fact serve as another factor supporting the claim that subsidy receipt is endogenous. Finally, it is assumed that the mother may derive disutility from receiving a child care subsidy as a result of stigma.
Under these assumptions, a mother maximizes her utility subject to her budget and time constraints, which can be expressed as follows: Let V i be the indirect utility associated with alternative i, which can be derived by solving the optimization problem. The value of receiving a subsidy can be written as
Similarly, the value of not receiving a subsidy is
A single mother will receive a subsidy if V i (s=1)>V i (s=0), Y + hW ≤ E s , and Similarly, the probability of standard employment conditional on not receiving a subsidy but being employed is
Therefore, the probability of standard employment conditional on subsidy status can be expressed as
According to (1) and (2), the only valid identifying instrument for s is the vector T s . Note that T s is a binary variable indicating whether a single mother who is eligible for a subsidy actually receives one. It can be assumed that the state's number of eligible children served by child care subsidies and the average amount of CCDF funds spent per child in a state are positively related to T s . Also, an eligible mother is more likely to receive a child care subsidy in states where mass media are used as a consumer education strategy in child care because she is more likely to be informed about the bureaucratic process, application procedures, and the various opportunities for child care assistance.
Based on the theoretical model, these factors should not influence equation (1). One may argue that the parameters of the state child care subsidy system, such as r, t s , and E s would serve as identifying instruments by affecting whether a mother receives a subsidy, but conditional on receiving a subsidy, not affecting the standard employment decision.
However, as indicated by the model and expressed by equation (2), these variables affect the standard employment decision. This is because the parameters that determine eligibility for a child care subsidy affect how much a mother can earn and thus the value of being employed and receiving a subsidy (Blau and Tekin 2003) .
Econometric Framework
The objective of the paper is to evaluate the impact of child care subsidy receipt on standard employment. Based on the theoretical model, the econometric model can be expressed by the following equations:
where S i is a binary indicator of subsidy receipt for mother i, ST i is the binary outcome of standard employment, X i is a vector of family characteristics, Z i is vectors of policy variables and other characteristics of the location of the residence of the family, ε and ν are disturbances, and β's, δ's, α, γ's, and ζ's are parameters. As the theoretical model implies, the demand for child care subsidies is determined by the price of child care, the mother's wage rate, nonwage income, preferences for consumption relative to leisure, the parameters of the subsidy program, the stigma of participating in a means-tested program, etc. These factors are determined in turn by family characteristics (X), the observed features of the state child care subsidy system (Z and T s ), and unobserved family and state characteristics (ε). Since equation (3) is a reduced form, it is not possible to identify the supply and demand effects of X, Z, and T s . Therefore, β's, δ's and µ's are the net effects of demand and supply forces on the subsidy receipt.
Identifying the causal impact of child care subsidy receipt on work schedule in equation (4) is complicated by the possibility that ε and ν are correlated. For example, a mother who is strongly motivated to work during standard hours may also be motivated to seek a child care subsidy in order to better accommodate her child care needs, generating a positive correlation between ε i and ν i . Alternatively, administrators of the subsidy system may give priority to the least employable mothers (Blau and Tekin 2003) , imparting a negative correlation. The theoretical model implies that the vector T s is a valid identifying instrument since it can be appropriately excluded from the standard work equation. Therefore, the factors that determine T s are treated as identifying instruments. As mentioned earlier, these characteristics include the average monthly number of eligible children served in the state, the average amount of CCDF funds spent per child in the state, and a binary variable indicating whether the state uses the mass media as a consumer education strategy. These are valid instruments assuming that they influence whether a parent receives a subsidy, but do not influence the standard/nonstandard work decision conditional on receiving a subsidy.
Another complication arises from the fact that ST is observed only for workers (i.e., for those with E=1). Thus, the estimates of equation (3) are subject to bias because of selection into the labor force. To overcome this problem, equations (3) and (4) 
Estimation of (3), (4), and (5) jointly using full information maximum likelihood requires calculating a trivariate integral. I use a random effects estimator with discrete factor approximation, also known as discrete factor method, to estimate the empirical model. The discrete factor method is well suited for this study because it is flexible method in the sense that it eliminates the need to evaluate multivariate normal integrals.
probabilities. Specifically, Pr(u = ω k ) = p k ≥ 0 for k = 1,….,K and ∑ K p k = 1. The number of points of support K, the location of the support points ω k and their probabilities p k are called incidental parameters and are estimated jointly with the other parameters of the system of equations. 7 Then the likelihood function for the system of equations can be written as
where Ф is the cumulative normal density function.
IV. Data
The data used in this paper are drawn from the second round of the National
Survey of America's Families (NSAF). It was conducted by the Urban Institute between
February and October 1999. with over 42,000 households. 7 The location and the scale of the distribution of u are not identified. Because each model contains an intercept and the factor loading parameters ρ 1 , ρ 2 , and ρ 3 are estimated in the parameterization, ω k is restricted to be between 0 and 1 (Picone et al. 2003) . Further parameterization is implemented as follows:
,….,k-1, and ω 0 = 0 and
. a's and b's are free parameters to be estimated. The likelihood function is maximized with respect to all the parameters including those describing heterogeneity. 8 The first round of the NSAF was conducted in 1997 with a different sample.
The NSAF is an ideal data source for the purpose of this study for several reasons.
First, it was specifically designed to analyze the consequences of devolution of responsibility for social programs from the federal government to the states. Second, the NSAF is unique in the sense that it provides the only nationally representative household data on child care subsidies. Previous studies have relied exclusively on administrative data to evaluate the impact of child care subsidies. However, there is no appropriate control group for administrative data since they usually contain information only on subsidy recipients. Third, the second round of the NSAF was conducted three years after the welfare reform legislation. In this respect, it presents a more comprehensive picture of the post-welfare reform environment. Finally, the NSAF provides a large sample of single mothers. I limit the sample to single mothers because the standard/nonstandard work behavior of married mothers may be quite different from that of single mothers as fathers are likely to be the primary child care provider when their spouses are at work. Also, single mothers are the primary target for aid under welfare law. For example, they accounted for over 90 percent of TANF cases in 1998 (Committee on Ways and Means, 2000) .
The sample used in the analysis includes 4,405 single mothers with at least one child under age 13. The NSAF contains information on child care subsidy receipt for children under age 13, which is the cut-off age for eligibility under CCDF. The mother is asked whether she receives any assistance paying for child care, including assistance from a welfare or social services agency, her employer, and a non-custodial parent. I code a mother as receiving a child care subsidy if she reports that a welfare or social services agency pays for all or part of the cost of child care for any of the children in the family. A mother is coded as working at a standard job if she reported performing her work during traditional hours of 8 a.m. to 6 p.m. during business days (Monday to Friday). Those who perform their work outside of those traditional hours are coded as working at nonstandard jobs. This group may include mothers who work weekends, evenings, split shifts, or irregular daily or weekly schedules since the NSAF does not distinguish between various types of nonstandard hours.
Definitions and the descriptive statistics used in the analysis are presented in Table 2 . Column I shows the means for the whole sample and the column II shows them for workers only. Columns III and IV display the means for standard and nonstandard workers, respectively. Column V displays the means for standard workers who are subsidy recipients and column VI displays the means for standard workers who are nonrecipients. As shown in column I, 11.6 percent of the sample receives a child care subsidy. The Administration for Children and Families (2000) predicts that between 12 and 15 percent of all eligible families received a CCDF subsidy in 1998-1999. The sample in this study includes all single mothers regardless of their income and some of these mothers are certainly ineligible for subsidies as their incomes exceed the threshold level.
9 Thus, 11.6 percent subsidy coverage rate is not unreasonable. The employment rate in the sample is 71.1 percent. Among those who are employed, 20.7 percent work nonstandard hours. Among workers, the subsidy receipt is higher for those who work standard hours than those who work nonstandard workers (13.1 percent versus 10.8 percent).
Under the new welfare system, parents are required to work or participate in work related activities (such as education, training, and job search) to be eligible for child care
subsidies. Therefore, we would expect subsidy recipients to have a higher employment rate than non-recipients. For the full sample, the employment rate is 77.1 percent among subsidy recipients and 70.3 percent among non-recipients (not shown in the table).
Similarly, standard work is more common among subsidy recipients than nonrecipients (82 percent versus 89 percent). These are statistically significant, but relatively small differences, suggesting that many non-working subsidy recipients may be attending school, training, or searching for employment. The NSAF reports the reasons offered by mothers for not working while receiving child care subsidy. A tabulation of these reasons indicate that over 90 percent of nonemployed subsidy recipients have a plausible reason for receiving a subsidy despite not being employed, such as attending school and actively seeking work.
Welfare recipients constitute 15.8 percent of the full sample. This figure matches perfectly with the Current Population Survey, which suggests a 15 percent welfare utilization rate for 1999 (Grogger 2003) . A higher percentage of nonstandard workers receive welfare than standard workers (14.2 percent versus 9.3 percent). This is reasonable given that standard workers have higher nonwage income and education than nonstandard workers on average. Furthermore, among standard workers, child care subsidy recipients are much more likely to be on welfare than nonrecipients, 29.4 percent versus 7.6 percent. Given the emphasis of the CCDF that gives priority to welfare recipients, the size of the gap is not surprising.
A full description of the occupational indicators is provided in Table B1 . As graduates with 8 percent of nonstandard and 17 percent of standard workers holding a bachelor degree or more. These patterns are consistent with those documented in previous studies using different data sources (e.g., Presser and Cox 1997; Kalleberg et al. 1997 ). Finally, blacks constitute a much larger portion of subsidy recipients among standard workers compared to whites (41 percent versus 28 percent).
In formulating equations (3), (4), and (5), I condition on a number of characteristics of the mother that reflect both demand and supply factors. These include her age, ethnicity, health status, education, presence of children, family structure, nonwage income, and region of residence. In addition to these variables, the occupation fixed effects are included in the nonstandard employment equation in order to control for any unobserved differences in demand for standard workers across different occupations.
The models also include state's median income, unemployment rate for females, state's percentage of female-headed households with children living under poverty, state's maximum amount of cash assistance for welfare recipients, state's earnings eligibility limit for child care for a single parent family of three, and monthly maximum income allowed for eligibility for a child care subsidy.
V. Results
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The results of the employment equation estimated to control for selection into the labor force are displayed in Table A1 . Virtually all variables either affect employment in the expected direction or are not related to employment. Since this equation is not central to the paper, the results will not be discussed in the text. receive a child care subsidy than both whites and other races. The likelihood of subsidy receipt also increases with the number of children ages 0-5 and 6-13 and the effect is stronger for the younger age group (4.9 percentage points versus 1.7 percentage points).
High school graduates and those with some college degree are 3.3 and 5.5 percentage points more likely to receive a child care subsidy than high school dropouts, respectively.
10 The results presented in this paper are taken from a model estimated with four points of support. A model with five points of support did not provide a significant improvement in the likelihood over a model with four points of support. Although there is no standard theory about how to select the number of points of support in a finite sample, the consensus is to add points of support until the likelihood fails to improve significantly (Blau and Hagy 1998; Heckman and Singer 1984; Mocan and Tekin 2003) . Mroz (1999) shows that the likelihood ratio test performs well when determining the number of points of support. The estimates of the heterogeneity parameters are presented in Appendix Table C1 . 11 Note that the majority of the explanatory variables are dichotomous. The marginal effects for these variables are calculated as 1/nΣ[Φ(C i |X i =1) -Φ(C i |X i =0)], where Φ is the standard cumulative normal distribution and Φ(C i |X i =1) is the predicted probability of standard employment for the ith mother given that the dichotomous variable X is equal to 1 and Φ(C i |X i =0) is her predicted probability given that the X is equal to 0. The marginal effects for the continuous variables are calculated based on infinitesimal changes. Calculating all the marginal effects for the dichotomous variables based on the latter approach did not change the results.
Mothers with higher nonwage income are less likely to receive a child care subsidy than others. A one thousand dollar increase in non-wage income results in a 3 percentage point decrease in the probability of receiving a child care subsidy. The presence of an additional relative in the household decreases the probability of subsidy receipt by 1.7
percentage points. The pattern of these findings is fully consistent with that of Blau and Tekin (2003) who investigate the determinants and consequences of child care subsidies using data from the NSAF.
It is important to note that the coefficients of the variables used as identifying instruments have the expected signs. As displayed in Table 3 , a single mother is about 3
percentage points more likely to receive a child care subsidy in states where mass media are used as a consumer education strategy for child care than other states. A one percentage point increase in the number of eligible children served by child care subsidies in a state increases the likelihood of subsidy receipt by a single mother by 0.89 percentage points. An increase in the CCDF funds per child by 1,000 dollars is associated with only a 0.26 percentage point increase in the probability of subsidy receipt, but the coefficient estimate is statistically insignificant. A specification test rejects the hypothesis that the coefficients of these three variables are jointly zero with a p-value of less than 0.01. The coefficients on the parameters of the state's subsidy program (copayment, reimbursements rate, and income eligibility limit) also have the expected signs, however, none of the coefficients is statistically significant. Mothers with at least a bachelor's degree are more likely to work at standard jobs than nonstandard jobs. This is consistent with the fact that standard jobs are more human capital demanding than nonstandard jobs. Whites are about 4 percentage points more likely to work at standard jobs than are blacks and other races. The number of children in a household is associated with a decrease in the likelihood of standard work, although the effect is significant only for younger children. This is consistent with Presser and Cox (1997) and Kimmel and Powell (2001) who suggest that given the decision to work, mothers with more children may use nonstandard work as a means of juggling work and family As displayed in Table 4 , occupational status is a strong determinant of a single mother's work schedule. Mothers working in technical, sales and support occupations, as well as protective services, precision production, craft, repairs, farming and fishing; or as machine operators, assemblers, handlers, equipment cleaners and helpers are less likely to work standard schedules, compared to the omitted categories (executive, administrative, managerial occupation), all else equal. This result is not surprising because these are the types of occupations in which the demand for nonstandard hours is usually high (Presser and Cox 1997) .
As the descriptive statistics indicate, welfare recipients are more likely to work at nonstandard jobs than nonrecipients. This may have unintended consequences in long run as welfare recipients try to advance in their careers over time. This is because it is usually the standard jobs that lead to permanent employment. Therefore, it is important to consider whether the impact of subsidy receipt differs between welfare recipients and non-recipients. Normally an indicator for mother's welfare receipt and its interaction with the subsidy receipt variable included into the standard/nonstandard work equation would provide the answer to this question. The differential impact of subsidy receipt on standard work is captured by the interaction term. However, welfare receipt is likely to be endogenous to both subsidy receipt and the standard work decision. 12 Therefore, including welfare receipt as an explanatory variable in the standard work equation might introduce bias to the estimates. In order to avoid this problem, the predicted probability of welfare receipt is constructed from a first stage regression. Then the predicted probability and its interaction with the child care subsidy receipt are included in the standard work equation, which is estimated jointly with the labor force participation and child care subsidy receipt equations using the discrete factor method explained previously. A better alternate would be to estimate an equation for welfare receipt jointly with the system of three equations. However, this alternative is not chosen due to the sensitivity of results to heterogeneity specification and failure in convergence. The state's earnings eligibility limit for TANF for a single parent family of three is used as an identifying instrument in the first stage.
The results of the first stage welfare equation are reported in Table A2 and they behave as one would expect. For example, less educated parents and parents with young children are more likely to use welfare than others. Whites, Hispanics, parents with better health and higher nonwage income are less likely to receive welfare than others. The identifying instrument, the state's TANF earnings eligibility for a single parent family of three is a positive and significant determinant of welfare receipt. A one hundred dollar increase in the earnings eligibility limit for a single parent applicant increases her probability of welfare receipt by 0.92 percentage point.
The results of the standard work equation with the welfare variable and its interaction with subsidy receipt are presented in Table 5 . The coefficient estimates on welfare and its interaction with subsidy receipt reveal something important about the role of child care subsidies on standard work. In particular, the findings indicate that child care subsidies serve as a major incentive for welfare recipients to work at standard jobs, but have a very small impact on nonrecipients. A subsidy-receiving mother is only 1.1
percentage points more likely to work at a standard job than a nonreceiving mother if she is not on welfare. This is a particularly small effect. However, if the mother is on welfare, she is 13.9 (1.1 + 12.8) percentage points more likely to work at a standard job when she is offered a child care subsidy. Similarly, welfare recipients are 15.6
percentage points less likely to work at standard jobs than nonrecipients if they are not offered a subsidy. However, the effect goes down to 3.8 percentage points if they are offered a subsidy. It must be noted that the model in Table 5 restricts the effects of variables other than the subsidy receipt to be the same between welfare recipients and nonrecipients. However, models allowing different effects for age, race, and education variables did not change the implication of the finding in any significant manner. These results suggest that child care subsidies induce welfare receiving mothers to work at standard jobs, but have much less impact for those who do not receive welfare. Most notably, this finding supports the states' current practice of giving priority to welfare recipients for child care subsidies.
Specification Checks
Occupation Indicators
As discussed earlier, the set of occupation dummies are strong determinants of standard work decision. These dummies are included in the analysis in order to control for the variation in the demand for standard hours and variability in the labor market conditions among occupations. 13 To ensure that the coefficient estimate of the child care subsidy receipt is not influenced by the possibility of occupation indicators being endogenous, the system of equations is estimated with the omission of these indicators.
Once these indicators are dropped, the coefficient estimate on the child care subsidy becomes for the model in Table 4 becomes 0.280, which is identical to the present coefficient. Therefore, the effect of child care subsidy receipt is not sensitive to the omission of occupation indicators.
Parameters of the state's child care subsidy system
According to the theoretical model, the parameters of the state's subsidy program (reimbursement rate, co-payment, income eligibility limit, etc) must enter all the equations. However, it can be argued that these parameters are endogenous. To entertain the possibility that the child care subsidy coefficient is contaminated by the endogeneity of the parameters of the state's subsidy program, the system of equations is estimated with the omission of these parameters in all three models. In a fully-reduced form model, these parameters are determined by observed parent characteristics, observed features of the state economy, and unobserved parent and state characteristics. Dropping these variables had no substantial effect on the estimates. Once these variables are dropped, the coefficient estimate and the marginal effect on the child care subsidy coefficient for the model in Table 4 are 0.232 and 0.046, respectively. This result is not surprising since none of coefficients of these variables was statistically significant when included in the model originally.
Identifying instruments
The choice of identifying instruments for the coefficient of child care subsidy receipt can theoretically be justified by the model presented earlier. The statistical support for these variables is verified first by testing whether the coefficients of these variables have a statistically significant effect in the subsidy equation. As mentioned in the results section, the p-value from this test is less than 0.01, indicating that they are jointly significant. This is not surprising given the fact that two of the three coefficients are highly significant individually in the subsidy equation as displayed in Table 3 . The second step is to verify that these three variables are not improperly excluded from the standard employment equation. Thus, the system of equations is estimated with the inclusion of the three variables into the standard employment equation. A likelihood ratio test failed to reject the hypothesis that the effects of the three instruments are jointly zero, providing further support that the three variables do not belong in the standard employment equations.
Childless women
As a final attempt to investigate the identification issue further, I implemented an exercise following Blau and Tekin (2003) . Specifically, I created a sample of childless women from the NSAF. Since these women are ineligible for child care subsidies by definition, a predicted subsidy receipt for a woman with no child should not have any impact on the probability of her standard work. I constructed a predicted subsidy for a sample of 4,582 childless women using the coefficients from a subsidy receipt regression estimated by probit. After the predicted probability of subsidy receipt was constructed for each woman, I assigned a 1 to a woman's status of child care subsidy status if her probability is greater than 0.50 and a 0 if the probability is less than 0.50. Then I estimated the system of three equations, subsidy receipt, standard employment, and labor force participation, using FIML. The coefficient estimate on the predicted subsidy receipt turned out to be, although positive, small in magnitude (0.022) and statistically insignificant (with a standard error of 0.262). Therefore, the subsidy receipt has no impact for a group of mothers for whom no such effect is expected.
VI. Conclusion
The evidence linking the quality of the initial job to the probability of maintaining employment and promoting career advancement suggests that finding a job itself may not necessarily result in moving single mothers toward economic self-sufficiency in the long run. It is therefore important to encourage low-income parents to get jobs, which have instthe potential to move them up the income ladder. This paper considers child care subsidies as a policy strategy for accomplishing this goal. Child care subsidies are an integral part of the new welfare system. Though subsidies are not usually limited to parents who are on welfare, they are especially vital for the success of welfare reform because of their role in helping parents make the transition from welfare to work and staying off welfare.
This paper provides evidence on the relationship between child care subsidies and standard work using data from the 1999 National Survey of America's Families. The findings suggest that child care subsidies induce mothers to work at standard jobs.
Specifically, single mothers with a child care subsidy are 6.1 percentage points more likely to work standard hours than others, all else being equal. When the impact of subsidy receipt is allowed to differ between welfare recipients and non-recipients, results
indicate that subsidies generate a relatively substantial incentive (about 14 percentage points) for single mothers to work at standard jobs while they have a much smaller impact (about 1 percentage point) on non-recipients. These results underscore the importance of child care subsidies in helping low income parents, especially welfare recipients, find jobs with the potential for long term economic self-sufficiency. These findings are particularly meaningful given the states' efforts to prioritize TANF recipients for child care assistance. For example, during 1999, 27 states guaranteed child care assistance to families transitioning from TANF to work, and 15 gave priority to those families (State Policy Demonstration Project 1999). However, according to the General Accounting Office, 23 states made changes to their child care assistance programs and decreased the availability of assistance since January 2001, mainly because of the financial crisis they were facing and the exhaustion of TANF surplus from prior years (GAO 2003) . Given these facts, results presented in this paper point to the need for a substantial increase in the amount child care funding in the new welfare reform bill in order to enable TANF participants to achieve real economic security in the long term.
Prospects of such expansions are not promising however; instead cuts in child care assistance are more likely in the current debate (Parrott and Mezey 2003) . Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistically significant difference in means between "standard work" and "nonstandard work" or "standard work and receive a subsidy" and "standard work and do not receive a subsidy" at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Nonwage income includes all income during 1996 except the mother's earnings and income from means-tested programs. Descriptions of occupation indicators are listed in Table B1 
